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When using the strategy method in ultimatum bargaining, many researchers ask responders for 
the minimal acceptable offer only implicitly assuming strategies to be monotone. Recent research 
has shown, however, that subjects decline disadvantageous and advantageous proposals. We re-
port on an ultimatum game video experiment where more than 50 percent of the responders re-
jected advantageous offers. Proposers and responders acted together in groups of three people 
each and were video taped during decision making. The videotapes then were content analyzed. 
Our experimental design provides the unique opportunity to learn from participants’ spontaneous 
discussions about their motivations for rejecting advantageous offers. Main motives are social 
concern, non-expectancy of high offers, emotional, ethical, and moral reasons, group-specific de-




Keywords: ultimatum game, video experiments, strategy method, content analysis, non-monotone 
strategies, social preferences 
  




Acknowledgement: We thank Hong Geng, Wei Deng and Ziyin Yan for transcribing the videos as well as for their 
assistance in text analyzing the transcripts. We are grateful to Heiko A. Schmidt for providing programming assis-
tance. Participants attending the following presentations gave helpful comments and suggestions: 2003 European 
Meeting of the Economic Science Association, Erfurt, Germany, 2004 Annual Meeting of Sozialwissenschaftlicher 
Ausschuss des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Graz, Austria, seminars given at the economics department of the Univer-
sities of Magdeburg, Cologne, Bonn and Arizona.. A first version of the paper was completed while Zhu-Yu Li vis-
ited the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at Bonn University. Financial support is gratefully acknowledged 
by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (446 CHV-111/1/00, HE 2790/2-1), EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR 
(FMRX-0238) for Heike Hennig-Schmidt, by National Natural Science Foundation of China, 79970099 for Zhu-
Yu Li, EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Program 4040060/99, 4040121/99 as well as Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft, 446 CHV 113/174/0-1, for both. 
                                                 
a) Corresponding author: Laboratory of Experimental Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42,  
D-53113 Bonn; Tel.: +49+228+73 9195; Fax: +49+228+73 9193; email: hschmidt@uni-bonn.de, URL: 
www.bonneconlab.uni-bonn.de. 
b) Mathematical College, Sichuan University, 29, Wangjiang Road, Chengdu 610064, PR China; Tel/Fax: 
+0086+28+5417673; email: zyli@scu.edu.cn. 
c) At the time of running the experiments, Ch. Yang was affiliated with the Laboratory of Experimental Economics.   1
Why People Reject Advantageous Offers – 
Non-monotone Strategies in Ultimatum Bargaining  
 
Evaluating a Video Experiment Run in PR China  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Experiments on the ultimatum game have shown remarkably stable deviations from purely self-
ish behavior. In the standard ultimatum game (GÜTH et al. 1982), a proposer can decide on how 
to split a given amount of money (the pie) between himself and a responder. The responder can 
either accept or reject the proposal. In case of acceptance, both receive the amounts as allocated, 
in case of rejection both receive nothing.  
Results from numerous symmetric ultimatum game experiments (UG in the following) with 
zero outside options have shown that individual proposers typically offer 30-50 percent of the 
pie, with the equal split often being the modal and median offer. Proposers who offer the re-
sponders less than 20 percent face rejection with high probability. These findings have been rep-
licated across different subject populations, with different monetary stakes and different ex-
perimental procedures (c.f. CAMERER 2003, FEHR and GÄCHTER 2000).  
Apparently, responders perceive highly disadvantageous allocations as unfair. In this situa-
tion, being treated unfairly corresponds to comparatively low payoffs. The monetary and the 
motivational incentive are not at odds. Thus, rejecting a low offer becomes a likely action. 
How do responders, however, behave if confronted with highly advantageous allocations? 
Advantageous offers
1, i.e. amounts higher than 50 percent of the pie, are unfair though, com-
pared to the proposer’s low share. In this situation, being treated unfairly corresponds to com-
paratively high payoffs. Does the now existing conflict between the monetary and the motiva-
tional incentive induce rejections of advantageous though unfair offers as well?  
There is growing experimental evidence that refuting advantageous offers is not a negligible 
phenomenon (c.f. section 2). In the present paper, we report on a remarkably high number of 
high offer rejections in a UG video experiment we have been conducting in the People’s Repub-
lic of China. Here, subjects were observed during decision making. Participants acted together 
in responder and proposer groups of three people each being video taped while making their de-
cision. This experimental setup provides the unique opportunity to learn from participants’ 
spontaneous discussions about their reasons and motivations for rejecting advantageous offers.
2 
The same rejection pattern as with groups, we in a UG played by individuals (GENG et al. 2004).  
Given our research agenda, it was essential to observe discussions on all potential offers. We 
therefore modified the standard sequential protocol of UG experiments by using a variant of the 
strategy method (SELTEN 1967) where responders have to discuss acceptance or rejection for the 
full strategy space.  
                                                 
1 HENRICH et al. (2001) call these offers „hyper-fair“.   2
Why is it important to analyze discussions on advantageous offer rejections? Despite the 
growing experimental evidence, the literature is far from giving a consistent explanation for 
such seemingly implausible behavior. Most of the available data allow indirect inferences only, 
based on observed decisions as well as on participants’ social characteristics (c.f. BAHRY and 
WILSON), follow-up questions, debriefings and conversations (c.f. CARDENAS 2003) or on ana-
lyzing participants’ cultural environment (c.f. HENRICH et al. 2001, TRACER 2004). To the best 
of our knowledge no data on advantageous offer rejections is analyzed so far that allow an in-
vestigation of subjects’ spontaneous articulations not being mediated by the researcher’s per-
sonal interpretation. The verbal material we obtained by combining video recording and strategy 
method allows to open the black box of decision motives regarding rejections of advantageous 
offers. 
Our study provides new insights in several respects. First, we found social concern to be the 
main motivation for refusing advantageous offers. This is in agreement with the basic assump-
tion of models of inequity aversion. An inequity averse responder suffers a loss in utility when 
he is worse off and when he is better off than the proposer (c.f. BOLTON and OCKENFELS 2000, 
FEHR and SCHMIDT 1999). Second, other motives turn out important as well. Among these are 
beliefs about sender behavior, in particular non-expectancy of high offers, but also emotional, 
ethical, and moral reasons, special decision rules employed in some groups and aversion against 
unpleasant numbers. Finally, the empirical findings on advantageous offer rejections might in-
duce a reconsideration of the assumptions on the parameter space in the models of inequity 
aversion.
3 
Last but not least, we assessed the robustness of our results as to advantageous offer rejec-
tions. To this end, we repeated the experiment with individual decision makers that were not ob-
served. We found individuals to show the same rejection behavior regarding high offers as 
groups do. For that reason, the assumption seems justified that motivations revealed during 
group discussions in the UG pertain to individuals as well. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 gives an overview on other 
experimental studies reporting advantageous offer rejections. In Section 3, we state our research 
goals, give a detailed description of the video and strategy method and report the experimental 
design. Section 4 presents the results. In the final section 5, we discuss our findings and con-
clude. 
 
2. Experimental evidence on advantageous offer rejections 
In the past, experimental research on UG typically focused on rejections of offers unfair to re-
sponders. Advantageous offers did not attract the attention of the profession the reason probably 
                                                                                                                                                            
2 According to LOOMES (1999), the use of audio or video records makes up one of the real challenges of experi-
mental economics in the future, see also CAMERER (2003, p.35) and GÜTH (2001). For a more elaborate discussion 
on this research method, see HENNIG-SCHMIDT (1999).    
3 Even though these models account for aversion against advantageous inequality they do not consider rejections of 
advantageous offers. Either the model does allow for declining advantageous offers rejections but assumes a rejec-
tion threshold not higher than the equal split (BOLTON and OCKENFELS 2000). Or the model parameters are speci-
fied in such a way that advantageous offers cannot occur (FEHR and SCHMIDT 1999).   3
being that experimental evidence on advantageous offers as well as on their rejection is rare. 
Moreover, some of the literature take it for granted that subjects have problems in understanding 
the game if they offer and/or reject more than 50 percent of the pie (c.f. BORNSTEIN and YANIV 
1998).  
Recently, however, researchers show growing interest in advantageous offer rejection start-
ing with the striking findings of HENRICH et al. (2001, 2004). The authors investigated non-
student populations of small scale societies in twelve countries on four continents. HENRICH et 
al. not only found that making advantageous offers are common in some of their subject pools
4. 
They also report that in some populations both unfair and advantageous offers are rejected with 
nearly equal frequency even when the offers amount to nearly a day's wage (see, for instance, 
the Au and Gnau of Papua New Guinea). 
A deeper look into the experimental literature shows that in addition to the HENRICH et al. in-
vestigation, advantageous offer rejections have been observed in quite a few studies even 
though the percentage is low when compared to rejections of unfair offers. In the following, we 
will report on some of the literature.  
ROTH et al. (1991) run a sequential repeated UG with students in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and 
the United States. A small percentage of US and Japanese participants rejected proposals larger 
than 50 percent (c.f. figures 3 and 4 in ROTH et al.). BORNSTEIN and YANIV (1998) report that 10 
percent of the 20 individual proposers offer more than 50 percent of the pie in a one-shot UG. 
FALK et al. (2003) conducted a mini UG with proposers having only two choices, either an offer 
smaller or an offer larger than the equal split. About 28 percent of the 45 proposers choose the 
high offer. Roughly 8 percent of these advantageous offers are rejected
5. CAMERER (2003) sur-
veys 15 UG studies in 13 of which small percentages of advantageous offers are reported. Four 
of these papers in addition to ROTH et al. (1991) state rejections of such offers.  
In a newspaper experiment using the strategy method
6, GÜTH et al. (2003) found 97, i.e. 9 
percent, of the 1,035 participating readers of a large German daily rejecting unfair and advanta-
geous offers. BELLEMARE and KRÖGER (2004) had a sample of the Dutch CentERpanel play the 
UG and found 41 percent of the 355 responders stating non-monotone strategies. Andreoni at al. 
(2003) conducted a convex UG (CUG) where proposers choose to divide a pie according to pre-
determined allocations. Responders then can shrink the pie down to 0 dollars. About 5 (2) per-
cent of the 56 proposers in each treatment offered more than the equal split in the convex (stan-
dard) UG. Moreover, 25 percent of the responders reduced the pie for unfair and advantageous 
offers in CUG, 5 percent rejecting both kinds of offers in UG. ECKEL (2004) reported non-
monotone rejection behavior as well. 
BOLTON et al. (2004) run a similar mini UG experiment like FALK et al. (2003) but used the 
strategy method. In their game, proposers have three options, the equal split, an unfair and an 
advantageous offer. The authors report about 15 percent rejections of advantageous offers. One 
                                                 
4 In fact, in 12 of their subject pools advantageous offers are made (HENRICH et al., 2004, figure 2.2, p. 19). 
5 In absolute terms, there are about 13 advantageous offers (own calculation based on figure 3 of FALK et al. 2003) 
and one rejection of such an offer.  
6 The following papers use the strategy method if not reported otherwise.   4
sender (about 1 percent) made an offer favoring the responder. SADRIEH and OSTERHOLT (1998) 
find a similar behavioral pattern in an UG group experiment where three subjects acted together 
as either a proposer or a responder. One out of nine responder groups (11 percent) rejected an 
offer higher than the equal split, one proposer group offered 80 percent of the pie.  
Finally, we report  on studies conducted in cultural environments different from Western 
standards. In a field UG experiment, conducted in two former soviet republics, Tatarstan and 
Sakha, BAHRY and WILSON (forthcoming) report 7 percent advantageous offers and 56 percent 
non-monotone responder strategies. CARDENAS (2003) running UG experiments with villagers 
near the Pacific coast of Colombia found the same rejection pattern with regard to offers unfair 
to either player. Moreover, about 10 percent of the 30 village proposers offered more than 50 
percent of the pie.
7  
 
3. Research questions, experimental methods and experimental design  
3.1 Research questions 
Apparently, rejections of advantageous offers occur in different cultures and in student as well 
as in non-student populations. Having access to discussions on advantageous offer rejections, 
our main research goal is to identify reasons and motivations that might cause subjects to reject 
such offers. Do we find evidence in the verbal data for social concern like bilateral fairness or 
aversion against advantageous inequality which might eventually lead to turning down high of-
fers? Are there other motives that induce subjects to reject favorable offers? We use content 
analysis as the method for extracting the answers to our research questions. Two coders inde-
pendently assigned segments of the video-taped discussions to categories constructed to capture 
potential motives for refusing high offers. The frequency of groups articulating a category at 
least once is taken as the measure of importance for the underlying motive. 
Why does our research add important contributions to the existing body of evidence on ad-
vantageous offer rejections? First of all, most of the available studies can only indirectly infer 
from observed decisions on participants’ underlying motives. Our data, however, allows the in-
vestigation of motives expressed by the subjects themselves during spontaneous conversation. 
Second, the few papers studying refutations of high offers do not give a consistent explanation 
for such seemingly implausible behavior. This is not surprising because due to the lack of moti-
vational data, these studies restrict their analysis on social characteristics or subject-independent 
data like participants’ cultural environment. We, however, base our investigation on subjects’ 
own verbalizations and thus on a much richer data base.  
Our research might prove also important for model building. Subjects’ discussions might not 
only corroborate existing models of social preferences but also reveal other important motives 
that are not captured yet. In addition, the empirical findings on rejecting high offers might lead 
to re-examine the assumptions on the parameter space in the models of inequity aversion 
(BOLTON and OCKENFELS 2000, FEHR and SCHMIDT 1999). 
                                                 
7Rejections of advantageous offers have also been found in UG experiments with incomplete information on the 
size of the pie (c.f. GÜTH and HUCK 1997, MITZKEWITZ and NAGEL 1991, 1993)   5
Other issues we are interested in are the following. Are groups heterogeneous in terms of 
strategies, and if so how does this affect the motives for rejecting advantageous offers? We as-
sume that a classification of strategies will help to understand differences in decision behavior, 
as it has helped to explain behavior in other game settings (e.g. FISCHBACHER et al., 2001). Does 
rejection behavior with regard to advantageous offers differ when the situation changes from a 
symmetric to an asymmetric setting?
8 Do individuals behave similar to groups as to rejecting 
high offers?  
 
 
3.2 Experimental methods 
Our main approach for eliciting subjects’ motivations on advantageous offer rejections is the 
video method. Three subjects play together as a group and have to take a consensus decision. As 
in the standard UG, proposers have to decide on dividing the pie, and responders have to decide 
on acceptance or rejection of the offer. Intra-group discussions are video taped, inter-group con-
tacts are anonymous with the experimenter transmitting decisions. The video-taped discussions 
are transcribed word for word into text protocols by graduate students having been particularly 
trained and instructed for this task. The transcripts are used for subsequent content analysis.
9 All 
transcripts have been translated into German allowing Chinese and German researchers to si-
multaneously work on the text protocols. 
The video method changes the standard experimental protocol in two respects. For one thing, 
individuals are substituted by groups. Secondly, groups are video taped. Both modifications may 
have an impact on behavior.
10 Yet, our focus is on understanding motives. Eliciting motives, 
however, involves a tradeoff between (a) directing subjects’ attention to the research interest by 
using for instance questionnaires or scales, or (b) using a natural environment for spontaneous 
discussions in a group setting where behavior can easily be observed. We decided to use the lat-
ter approach keeping in mind that the video method might change behavior. To control for 
group behavior and observation, we repeated the UG experiment with individual decision mak-
ers that were not observed.  
Another feature of our experiment is the application of a variant of the strategy method 
(SELTEN 1967). Players decide simultaneously, responders having to report acceptance or rejec-
tion for any possible offer.
11 In this respect, our design differs from other research approaches in 
                                                 
8 We run sessions with zero outside options for both the proposer and the responder as well as sessions where in 
case of rejection the proposer gets a higher payoff than the responder. For a detailed analysis on the impact of 
asymmetric outside options on decision behavior see HENNIG-SCHMIDT (2002), HENNIG-SCHMIDT and KOHNZ 
(2004). 
9 Verbal data are increasingly used to explain quantitative results. See for instance CHARNESS and DUFWENBERG 
(2004) and COOPER and KAGEL (2003) who analyse messages written by experimental subjects. See also BEWLEY 
(1999) who interviewed business people to learn about wage rigidity in recessions.  
10 It is not clear that both modifications indeed induce an effect. There is inconclusive evidence whether groups 
behave differently from individuals. Moreover, the available evidence in the literature suggests that observation 
does not systematically affect behavior. See BOSMAN et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion of these two issues.  
11 We decided to use the strategy method because it asks not only for acceptance or rejection of the actual offer but 
also for all other possible allocations. Thus, it provides the information we require with respect to our research 
agenda. The literature on how the strategy method affects behavior is inconclusive, though. BRANDTS and   6
that we elicit the full strategy space and not only minimal acceptable offers (MAOs) as for in-
stance BUCHAN et al. (forthcoming) and KNEZ and CAMERER (1995). Asking for MAOs only, 
implicitly assumes, however, that responders state monotone strategies, i.e. accept all offers 
above the stated acceptance threshold. Non-monotone strategies, i.e. rejections of low and high 
offers, cannot be revealed by this elicitation method. 
 
3.3 Experimental design and procedures 
Design  
Our experiment is based on a one-shot UG, with in this case groups (of three participants) as 
players. A proposer P has to decide about the division of a given pie of 20 tokens which she can 
allocate between herself and the responder R. P decides on the amount x∈{0,1,...,19,20} to be 
sent to R. Simultaneously and independently, R states acceptance or rejection for any possible 
offer. In case of acceptance of x, P receives the payoff 20 – x, and R gets x. In case of rejection, 
both receive nothing (treatment T1). In two additional treatments, P is guaranteed a positive out-
side option of 8 in case of rejection whereas R’s outside option is 0 or 2 respectively (T2 or T3). 
Table 1 summarizes the parameters of the three treatments. 
 
Table 1 – Experimental treatments 
treatment        treatment       outside option       number of                         number of  






T1 symmetric    0  0  12  12  12 
T2 asymmetric    8 0  12  12  12 
T3 asymmetric    8 2  12  12  12 
 
The sub-game perfect equilibrium in T1 is x=0 if money is infinitely divisible. P will keep 
the whole endowment which R will accept. With a smallest money unit of 1 token a second sub-
game perfect equilibrium exists, namely x=1. P will send an amount equal to the smallest 
money unit which R will accept since she is better off than when rejecting. With a similar argu-
ment, the second sub-game perfect equilibrium in T2 (T3) is x=1 (x=3). 
 
The experiment was run at Sichuan University, Chengdu, PR China, in July 2001 and August 
2002. In total, 208 students, almost all undergraduate students from Sichuan University, partici-
pated in 12 experimental sessions of each treatment, each session providing one independent 
observations. Students majored in natural sciences, economics and humanities. Subjects were 
recruited by campus advertisements promising monetary reward for participation in a video de-
cision-making task. Registration was arranged such that three subjects played together in a 
group being assigned to rooms separate from each other. This procedure guaranteed full ano-
                                                                                                                                                            
CHARNESS (2000), CASON and MUI (1998), OXOBY and MCLEISH (2004) do not find differences on behavior 
whereas BROSIG et al. (2003) and GÜTH et al. (2001) do. In a recent study, BROSIG et. al. (2004) find no behav-
ioural divergence when investigating groups as decision makers.   7
nymity between proposer and responder groups interacting in a session. Due to no show-ups, 8 
of the 72 groups consisted of only 2 people. Groups were randomly assigned to be proposers or 
responders.  
Sessions lasted for about 35 minutes. The monetary reward was calculated to equal the 
hourly wage in a typical students’ job of about 35 - 45 RMB (Chinese Yuan). For each token re-
tained by his/her group, each group member was paid 2 RMB. In addition, a show-up fee of 10 
RMB was paid independently of the subject’s earning in the experiment. On average subjects 
earned 27.82 RMB (3.72 Euro) including the show-up fee. The amounts paid to participants are 
at the upper range of the wage distribution for Chinese students. Instructions have been worded 
as neutral as possible, avoiding any suggestive terms (a translation of the Chinese instructions is 
provided in Appendix C).  
 
Procedures  
In each experimental session, the following procedure was used. Participants of the proposer 
and responder groups arrived in separate rooms. In each room, one native experimenter read the 
Chinese instructions for the Ultimatum Game
12. Subjects were then requested to read them care-
fully again and to ask questions which were answered. All participants were fully informed on 
all features of the experimental design and the procedures. 
Each proposer group had 15 minutes to make a decision on their proposal x to the responder 
group. Each responder group also had 15 minutes to make their decision on acceptance or rejec-
tion of any possible offer. All discussions were video taped. The decisions had to be taken 
jointly within the groups and then filled in on the corresponding forms (decision forms are pro-
vided in Appendix C). All group members had to agree by signing the forms. When the decision 
time was over, the experimenters matched the proposal and acceptance or rejection and in-
formed the groups about the result. There was no face-to-face contact between proposer and re-
sponder groups. Finally, participants were paid out in their groups and dismissed.  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Final decisions 
We first report on final decisions in the three treatments. Results in the standard treatment T1 
are in line with individual non-observation UG experiments discussed in the introduction. 
Proposers’ mean offer is 41 percent of the pie, and responders on average reject offers lower 
than 20 percent (c.f. Table 2). These numbers are far above the standard game theoretic 
predictions stated in section 3.3. In T2 and T3, average offers and average lowest acceptance 
levels (LAL in the following) are higher than predicted, too. 
 
                                                 
12 Instructions were translated into Chinese by one of the authors, Chaoliang Yang, who is a Chinese native speaker 
and both linguistically and culturally fluent in German. All three authors intensively collaborated during the trans-
lation process.   8
 
Table 2 - Offers, lowest acceptance levels (percent of pie) and rejections of advantageous offers 











T1  41.2 (9.1)  20.4 (12.1)  58.3 (7/12) 
T2  33.7 (8.6)  12.5 (13.4)  58.3 (7/12) 
T3  32.1 (6.6)  
[22.1 (6.6)] 
21.6 (12.7)  
[11.7 (12.7)] 
41.7 (5/12) 





1) Numbers in italics account for responders’ positive outside option in T3       
2) percent of sessions 
 
 
Offers and LALs in all three treatments are shown in Figure 1a and 1b. 
 
 
Figure 1a: Offers in T1, T2, T3  Figure 1b: Lowest acceptance levels in T1, T2, T3 
 
 
4.2 Classification of strategies 
We next deal with strategy types. Figures 1-3 in Appendix A show responder groups’ strate-
gies and proposer groups’ offers. Two kinds of strategies can clearly be distinguished with re-
gard to monotonicity of rejection behavior. We call a strategy monotone as to rejection if all of-
fers lower than any rejected offer are rejected as well. Non-monotone strategies are those where 
the above definition does not hold. In the context of the present paper, we use non-monotonicity 
of a strategy synonymously with rejecting one or more advantageous offers. 
Monotone and non-monotone strategies can again be split into two subcategories each. Ra-
tional monotone strategies conform with the standard game theoretic predictions discussed in 
section 3.3. Strategies are termed stylized if they correspond to the stylized facts known from 
UG experiments discussed in the introduction, i.e. subjects reject offers higher than the lowest 
monetary unit as well.  
Non-monotone strategies are classified as follows. Systematic non-monotone strategies show 
a clear pattern. They either entail one rejection threshold involving acceptance of all offers 
lower than this limit. Or they comprise two rejection thresholds, all offers below the lower ac-








































Chin T3  9
The low and the high rejection thresholds are the boundaries of an area of accepted offers.
13 Un-
systematic non-monotone strategies do not exhibit a clear pattern of rejection behavior.  
 
Table 3 – Classification of strategies  
Classification  T1 T2 T3 Frequency  all  Percent  all 
monotone    5 5 7  17  47.2 
rational  1 2 3  4  11.1 
stylized  4 3 4  13  36.1 
non-monotone    7 7 5  19  52.8 
systematic   3 5 4  12  33.3 
unsystematic  4 2 1  7  19.5 
 
Table 3 shows the frequency of strategies according to our classification. A remarkably low 
percentage of only 47 percent of the strategies are monotone. Roughly two thirds of these 
strategies conform to the stylized facts of numerous standard UG experiments.  
Non-monotone strategies are stated by more than half of all responder groups. We find this a 
surprising result in light of the previous findings on UG experiments. Note, however, that non-
monotonicity of strategies can only be revealed if subjects have to state the full strategy space 
and not only minimal acceptable offers as elicited in other experiments (c.f. KNEZ and CAMERER 
1995).  
 
RESULT 1:  
More than half of the groups state non-monotone strategies. 
 
4.3 Analysis of verbal data 
Result 1 shows non-monotone strategies to be a non-negligible phenomenon in the present 
study. Therefore, our main research goal is to identify reasons and motivations that might cause 
subjects to reject advantageous offers. We are particularly interested in finding evidence in the 
verbal data for social concern like fairness and aversion against advantageous inequality that 
might eventually result in turning down high offers. Are there other motivations that induce sub-
jects to refuse amounts higher than the equal split? 
 
Categories 
We use content analysis as the method of analyzing the transcribed video-taped discussions 
within the groups. According to SMITH (2000, p. 314), content analysis is "… a technique used 
to extract the desired information from a body of material (usually verbal) by systematically and 
objectively identifying specified characteristics of the material". The desired information we are 
interested in are the reasons and motivations of subjects’ rejecting advantageous offers. We ex-
tract this information by coding the verbal protocols. Coding denotes the process of assigning 
text segments to categories. These categories were designed to capture potential motives for re-
fusing high offers. Creating the categories was based on the following considerations. Firstly, 
categories account for hypotheses stated in the literature.  
                                                 
13 BELLEMARE and KRÖGER (2004) call such behavior ‘plateau behavior’.   10
-  Concern for others is incorporated into models of social preferences (c.f BOLTON and 
OCKENFELS 2000, FEHR and SCHMIDT 1999). Concern for others also matches the obligation 
for social attention essential to the Confucian background of our experimental subjects (c.f. 
CHINESE CULTURE CONNECTION, 1987).  
-  We base our analysis on Chinese verbal material. We, therefore, account for categories 
matching other features of our participants’ cultural environment. These are for instance 
shame avoidance, face damage and other ethical and moral norms. Moreover, subjects might 
reject advantageous offers on emotional grounds or because of ethical reasons other than bi-
lateral views of social concern (c.f. BOND 1996, BOND and HWANG 1986). 
-  It has also been argued that high offers are rejected because subjects do not expect proposers 
to make advantageous offers thus truncating the strategy space (c.f. HUCK 1999). As BOLTON 
et al. (2004, 9) put it “… responders understood that Proposal A [an advantageous offer in 
our terminology] was very unlikely and rejections represent a form of cheap (fairman) talk”. 
Therefore, responders do not bear any costs when turning down these offers.  
- HENRICH et al. (2004) attribute the refusal of seemingly generous offers to the culture of 
status-seeking through gift-giving. They argue that accepting gifts, even unsolicited ones, 
implies strong obligations to reciprocate at some point in the future, possibly not to the re-
sponder's liking. Therefore excessively large offers are frequently refused (see also HANNIG 
1988, OSTMANN 2002).  
 
Secondly, we base categories on characteristics of the discussions we found important as to our 
research agenda.  
-  Participants use specific rules to decide on acceptance or rejection, as for instance random 
choices.  
-  They reject offers when unpleasant numbers are involved.  
-  One group made a mistake when stating rejection of an advantageous offer.  
-  In many cases, subjects asserted refusal without reasoning.  
 
Table 4 shows the main categories of our classification system. 
 
Inter-coder reliability  
Two undergraduate native raters were extensively trained to do the coding. They screened the 
Chinese transcripts for discussions of advantageous offer rejections. 109 occurrences of such 
discussions were found which we call the pool of discussed advantageous offer rejections. The 
coders then independently classified the discussions according to the classification system in ta-
ble 4
14. They were provided with a detailed coding manual which carefully explained categories 
and gave examples what to code and what not to code (for requirements as to the coding manual 
c.f. SMITH 2000). Coding was made very restrictive in order to exclude raters’ interpretations as 
                                                 
14 For the categories that constitute a main category, see Table B1 in Appendix B.   11
far as possible. Only when a rejection of an advantageous offer and the category characteristic 
were explicitly mentioned during a discussion, this text segment was assigned to a category
15. 
 




1 Social  concern 
2 Group-specific  rules 
3  Unlikeliness of high offer 
4  Emotional, ethical, moral reasons 
5 Unpleasant  numbers 
6  Error (mistakenly stating rejection) 
7  Reciprocity avoidance  
8 No  reasoning 
 
Data are reliable only if inter-coder agreement on category assignments is high. Therefore, 
inter-rater reliability was assessed after coding had been finished. A generally accepted measure 
for inter-coder reliability is Cohen’s Kappa Κ which accounts for the agreement that would re-
sult if coders merely make random assignments (c.f. SIEGEL and CASTELLAN 1988)
16. Κ can take 
values between +1.00 and –1.00, where +1.00 means complete agreement, 0 means no agree-
ment above chance, and –1.00 is complete disagreement. Κ ≥ .80 indicates satisfactory inter-
rater reliability (c.f. MERTENS 1995, SMITH 2000). With regard to values < .80, there is no defi-
nite answer in the literature. KRIPPENDORF (1980, 147) remarks: “Standards for data reliability 
should not be adopted ad hoc. They must be related to the validity requirements imposed upon 
research results, specifically to the cost of drawing wrong conclusions. … If it is an exploratory 
study without serious consequences that level may be relaxed considerably, but it should not be 
so low that the findings can no longer be taken seriously.” For our exploratory study we take Κ 
≥ .70 as a satisfactory reliability standard.  
For the vast majority of categories, Κ ≥ .70 or slightly below our acceptance standard (see 
Table B1 in Appendix B). We find an unsatisfactory agreement level in four categories only. 
These low agreement levels result from categories that were coded infrequently demonstrating 
that a small number of codings might have a large effect on Κ if raters disagree.
17 We conclude 
that on average our classification system yields satisfactory data. 
Finally, coder disagreement has to be resolved in order to base our analysis on as much data 
as possible. We followed a procedure suggested by BARTHOLOMEW et al. (2000). If two coders 
disagree on a categorical assignment, a third rater is added, and the classification agreed upon 
                                                 
15 In several cases, subjects started sentences which they did not finish. One could have inferred from the context 
what they probably wanted to say. These discussions, however, were not included in the pool of advantageous offer 
rejections. 
16 Κ is the ratio of the proportion of times the coders agree, P(A), (corrected for chance agreement, P(E)) to the 
maximum proportion of times they could have agreed (corrected for chance agreement), i.e. Κ = [P(A) – P(E)]/[(1- 
P(E)]. 
17 For instance can the value of Κ change from 1 to 0 if there is only one assignment in a category, and coders agree 
or disagree, respectively.   12
by two of the three raters becomes the final rating. With this procedure, 13 out of the 19 dis-
agreements could be resolved.  
 
Data analysis 
We now turn to the analysis of motivations inducing subjects to reject advantageous offers. The 
motivations correspond to the categories of our classification system. We base our analysis on 
the main categories 1 - 8 in table 4. We measure the importance of a main category by the per-
centage of groups that articulate this main category at least once.
18 Figure 3 displays the impor-
tance of main categories. Note, that groups articulate more than one motivation (see table 5). 
Therefore, percentages add up to more than 100 percent. 
Our measure of importance also allows us to resolve the remaining inter-rater disagreements 
up to category 4a “shame avoidance”. All other categories have been agreed upon by at least 
two coders for every non-monotone responder group. Category 4a will be referred to as “not 
classifiable” in the following. 
We are now able to answer our main research question. Do we find evidence in the verbal 
data for social concern that might eventually result in turning down high offers? Are there other 
motivations for rejecting advantageous offers? 
In the following, we discuss the main categories according to their importance. Quotations 
from the transcripts can be found in Appendix B2. 
 
MAIN CATEGORY 1: Social Concern   The most important main category is Social Concern. 58 
percent of the non-monotone groups discuss this category. Main category 1 was designed to 
capture the basic idea of social preferences (see FEHR and SCHMIDT 2003 for an overview) in-
cluding further aspects of subjects’ caring about others in addition to aversion against advanta-
geous inequality. There are five categories, 1a: Mutually unacceptable allocations, 1b: Injuring 
bilateral fairness, 1c: Allocations to the disadvantage of either player are unlikely, 1d: Rejecting 
all but middle (balanced) allocations and 1e: Extensive responder's profit.  
Worrying about others’ material benefit is, however, not the only motivation that induce sub-
jects to turn down favorable offers. Nearly as important are the main categories Group-specific 
Rules and Unlikeliness of High Offer.  
 
 
                                                 
18 We do not use the frequency of a main category as a measure of importance because from our point of view this 
is not appropriate. Firstly, the frequency of coding does not necessarily tell us something about the importance of a 
category. Imagine, for instance, a group that disagrees on accepting an offer of say 17. They will discuss this pro-
posal rather frequently until they come to an agreement. If the group agrees on the same offer, however, they will 
talk about this allocation much less often. Secondly, our last research goal is to relate our findings to group behav-
ior, i.e. strategy types and treatments. We, therefore, need a measure of importance that directly refers to group be-
havior. Note that there is a high correlation between frequency of coding in a main category and the number of 
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Figure 3: Importance of main categories 
 
MAIN CATEGORY 2: Group-specific Rules The second most frequently articulated main category 
concerns group-specific rules being discussed by 53 percent of the non-monotone groups. It 
comprises categories 2a: Reinterpretation of the experimental rules, 2b: Going for risk, 2c: 
Group specific systems or methods for acceptance or rejection, 2d: Point matching of advanta-
geous offer and accepted allocation. Here, groups are coded that for different reasons suggest 
specific choice procedures. Some subjects intentionally suggest to go for risk or choose ran-
domly (using the game ‘rock, paper, scissors’) being aware that this might turn out costly. Fi-
nally, some groups apparently have difficulties in applying the experimental rules properly.  
 
MAIN CATEGORY 3 Unlikeliness of High Offer Main category 3 is designed to capture beliefs 
about sender behavior, in particular non-expectancy of advantageous offers. It is the third most 
frequently coded main category which 42 percent of the groups discuss. 
 
MAIN CATEGORY 4: Emotional, ethical, moral reasons Main category 4 is coded in 16 percent 
of the groups. It comprises categories that refer to the Confucian background of our subjects. 4a: 
Shame avoidance (not classifiable), 4b: Face damage, 4c: Refusal due to emotional, ethical, 
moral reasons other than 4a and 4b, 4d: Refusal due to particular Chinese ways of thinking and 
norms other than 4a – 4c. 
 
MAIN CATEGORY 5: Unpleasant numbers  is coded in 11 percent of the groups. Unpleasant 
numbers are those perceived by our Chinese subjects as unlucky like for instance 4, 14 (same 
pronunciation like death) and 13. Subjects sometimes also have an aversion against odd num-
bers (整数) as well as against “non-round” numbers because they are not divisible by 10 with-
out remainder. Participants dislike allocations involving these numbers even though accepting a 
corresponding offer would have provided them with a higher payoff.   14
 
MAIN CATEGORY 6: Error (mistakenly stating rejection) The text analysis revealed that one 
group (group 6, treatment 2) wanted to reject the extremely unfair allocation 0/20 rather than the 
advantageous allocation 20/0 which they mistakenly refused in the decision sheet.  
 
MAIN CATEGORY 7: Reciprocity avoidance  is the main category that captures arguments in fa-
vor of status-seeking through gift-giving. As HENRICH et al. (2001) reason, in some cultures 
subjects may reject advantageous offers even in a one-shot experiment with anonymous interac-
tion. Subject experience the experimental setting like a familiar real-life situation where they 
would have to reciprocate a large gift at some point in the future.  
We expected to find comparable arguments during the group discussions because in the Chi-
nese society, large gifts do create strong obligations to give in return at a later date. We, how-
ever, did not find any argument explicitly favoring rejection because of reciprocity avoidance in 
the future. Yet we did find arguments showing that subjects feel uncomfortable about advanta-
geous offers because they may involve a trick or a ploy.  
 
MAIN CATEGORY 8: No reasoning   68 percent of the groups are coded for main category 8. This 
percentage, however, does not mean that main category 8 is the most important one. Subjects 
used to discuss acceptance or rejection according to the decision sheet which displayed possible 
allocations in an ascending order. Most often, subjects start discussing motivations for rejecting 
an advantageous offer at a certain division of the pie. They in general do not repeat their argu-
ments later on, but just state rejection. Therefore, if it was not possible to trace the correct cate-
gory, rejection was coded in main category 8. It never occurred, however, that only this category 
was coded for a group (c.f. Table 5). 
 
RESULT 2: There is evidence in the data for social concern to be the main motivation for turning 
down advantageous offers. Other reasons like group-specific rules and unlikeliness of high of-
fers are important as well. Even though reciprocity avoidance was not coded, some discussions 
point to uneasiness with high offers.  
 
4.4 Analysis of non-monotone strategies and treatments 
We finally deal with the question whether our previous findings can be related to strategy 
types in non-monotone sessions and to treatments.  
 
Indicators for unsystematic behavior 
We first investigate whether certain main categories/motivations are indicators for unsystem-
atic behavior. Table 5 shows the main categories mentioned in systematic and unsystematic 
non-monotone groups. In the following analysis we omit group 2.06 because participants made 
a mistake when rejecting an advantageous offer.  
It has been argued advantageous offer rejections to indicate that groups do not understand the 
game. We have seen above that this line of reasoning does not hold in general because groups   15
state reasonable motivations for rejecting offers higher than the equal split. We found, however, 
that groups who use or interpret the rules in a specific way tend to create unsystematic behavior 
(Fisher exact test, p=0.05). Apparently, unsystematic groups either do not understand the rules 
of the game or they intentionally use own rules being aware that they might lose money.
19 
 
Table 5: Main categories 1 –8 in systematic and unsystematic non-monotone groups 
Main Groups 
cat.  1.01 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.10 1.11 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.10 3.01 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06
1                                   
2                               
3                                
4                        
5                      
6                      
7                     
8                                   
unsys.  X     X  X    X  X  X         X     




We next analyze whether asymmetry influences strategy types. We do not find any signifi-
cant treatment effect as to monotonicity, however (FISHER exact test, p > 0.30).   
 
Table 6: Importance of main categories in T1, T2, T3 
Main categories  Percentage in treatment
1) 
 T1  T2  T3 
1. Social concern   86  43  40 
2. Group-specific rules  71  43  40 
3. Unlikeliness of high offer  57  14  60 
4. Emotional, ethical, moral reasons  29  0  20 
5. Unpleasant numbers   14  0  20 
6. Error   0  14  0 
7. Reciprocity avoidance   0  0  0 
8. No reasoning  100  57  40 
    Not classifiable  14  0  0 
1) percentage of non-monotone responder groups in each treatment 
 
Finally, we investigate possible treatment effects with regard to the importance of main cate-
gories. We again do not find significant differences between treatments. Yet, table 6 shows that 
social concern scores twice as high in T1 as in T2 and T3. These finding seems to indicate that 
main category 1 plays a minor role in the asymmetric settings. 
 
                                                 
19 Moreover, groups who score for emotional, ethical, moral reasons also score for unpleasant numbers (FISHER ex-
act test, p=0.02).   16
RESULT 3: Group specific rules are indicators for unsystematic behavior. Treatments do not 
differ as to strategy types, yet social concern tends to become less important in asymmetric 
treatments. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Our study showed that rejecting advantageous offers is quite common not only in Chinese re-
sponder groups but also with individual responders. Content analyzing the group discussions of 
our video experiment revealed a variety of motives that induce responders to refuse offers 
higher than the equal split. The most important motive is social concern which captures basic 
aspects of social preferences.
20 Other motives turn out important as well. Among these are be-
liefs about sender behavior, in particular non-expectancy of high offers, but also emotional, 
ethical, and moral reasons, special decision rules employed in some groups and aversion against 
unpleasant numbers. Even though reciprocity avoidance was not coded, some discussions point 
to uneasiness with high offers. 
It has been argued that advantageous offers in our video setting are rejected because subjects 
play in groups, are observed and do not want to appear greedy by accepting the larger part of the 
pie. There are two major objections against this critique. First, the observation effect can be 
ruled out if we run an individual experiment where subjects are not observed and still reject ad-
vantageous offers Second, if monotone and sender groups discuss non-monotone strategies as 
well, this seems a strong indicator for non-monotone strategies to be a common behavioral pat-
tern in our subject pool.  
To exclude the observation effect, we run a repetition of the present experiment with Chinese 
individuals acting independently and anonymously (GENG et al. 2004). 12 percent of the 90 
senders offered amounts higher than the equal split. 47 percent of the responders, i.e. 38 out of 
89 subjects, rejected advantageous offers.
 The same rejection pattern was shown by Chinese at-
tendants of a workshop on “Experimental Economics” (professors, post docs and graduate stu-
dents). In addition, researchers affiliated to a University in the east of China behaved similarly 
in a ‘classroom’ experiment where senders could only chose between two advantageous alloca-
tions. Our studies show that non-monotone strategies are a robust behavioral pattern in China.  
As to the second objection, Figure 4 shows the importance of the main categories in proposer 
and monotone responder groups. About 50 percent of each player type discussed rejections of 
advantageous offers. As with non-monotone groups, social concern and unlikeliness of high of-
fer are the most important main categories. Overall, 28 responders – monotone and non-
monotone groups – and 19 senders argue about refusing high offers, i.e. 65 percent of all 72 
groups participating in the experiment. We therefore conclude that rejecting advantageous offers 
is a phenomenon taken into account by a vast majority of participants in our experiment and 
thus cannot be dismissed as anomalous or irregular.  
 
                                                 
20 Social concern was also found to induce rejections of high offers in a video UG experiment run in Germany (c.f. 
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Proposer groups Monotone groups
Figure 4: Importance of main categories in proposer and monotone responder groups  
 
Our study provides new insights since the verbal data on discussions allows the investigation 
of motives expressed by the subjects themselves. Combining video recording and strategy 
method enables us to directly analyze decision motives instead of indirectly inferring motives 
from choices. Our analysis is based on discussions within groups. It can be argued that individu-
als playing in groups behave differently than individuals playing on their own. Our control treat-
ment showed, however, that the percentage of individuals stating non-monotone strategies 
corresponds to the group video experiment. We therefore assume that motivations revealed dur-
ing group discussions in the UG pertain to individuals as well. 
We found social concern to be the main motivation for non-monotone strategies. In that re-
spect, models of social preference, in particular models of inequity aversion, capture an impor-
tant behavioral aspect in ultimatum bargaining (c.f. BOLTON and OCKENFELS 2000, FEHR and 
SCHMIDT 1999). On the other hand, advantageous offer rejections cannot be handled by these 
models due to restrictions on the parameter space. The ERC model by BOLTON and OCKENFELS 
does allow for declining advantageous offers but assumes a rejection threshold not higher than 
the equal split. In the FEHR/SCHMIDT model, the specification of model parameters rules out re-
jections of advantageous offers. The empirical findings on high offer rejections in the present 
paper and in the studies surveyed in section 2 speaks to a reconsideration of the assumptions on 
rejection behavior. 
Our study also showed other important motives to induce non-monotone behavior. There are 
other forms of social concern in addition to aversion against advantageous inequality. Moreover, 
responders form beliefs about senders’ behavior not expecting offers higher than the equal split.  
Most experimental studies that report rejections of advantageous offers use the strategy 
method. It could be argued that subjects reject in hypothetical situations. When they are con-
fronted with actual advantageous offers, however, they will rather accept than reject. Some   18
studies, nonetheless, document rejections of high offers also in hot
21 situations (c.f. BORNSTEIN 
and YANIV 1998, HENRICH et al. 2001, ROTH et al. 1991). This phenomenon needs to be investi-




Appendix A: Strategies 
                                                 
21 Hot refers to a situation where subjects react to actual offers in contrast to “cold” situations where they have to 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Accept/reject Sender's decision  19
Appendix B 
 
Table B1 – Classification system, Cohen’s Kappa Κ and average coding frequencies 
Catego-
ries 
Classification system  Cohen’s 
Kappa Κ  
Average coding 
frequency 
     1  Social concern    31.5 
1a  Mutually unacceptable allocations   0.70 11.0 
1b  Injuring bilateral fairness   1.00 1.00 
1c  Allocations to the disadvantage of either 
player are unlikely 
0.85 
3.50 




1e  Extensive responder's profit  0.80  11.00 
     2  Group-specific rules    13.00 
2a  Reinterpretation of the experimental rules  0.66 1.50 
2b  Going for risk  1.00 1.00 
2c  Group specific systems, methods for accep-
tance or rejection 
0.92 6.50 
2d  Point matching of advantageous offer and 
accepted allocation 
1.00 4.00 
    3  Unlikeliness of high offer  0.74  21.5 
    4  Emotional, ethical, moral reasons     
4a Shame  avoidance  0.00 0.05 
4b Face  damage  1.00 1.00 
4c  Refusal due to emotional, ethical, moral rea-
sons other than 4a and 4b  
0.56 3.50 
4d  Refusal due to particular Chinese ways of 
thinking and norms other than 4a – 4c 
1.00 0.00 
     5  Unpleasant numbers  0.66  3.00 
     6  Error (mistakenly stating rejection)  1.00  1.00 
     7  Reciprocity avoidance   1.00  0.00 
     8  No reasoning  0.87  32.0 
 
 
B2: Quotations from the text protocols 
(Numbers 1 – 3 stand for group members) 
 
CATEGORY 1a: Mutually Unacceptable Allocations (Group 7, Treatment 1) 
2  因为如果处于极端的话可能没有谁愿意。  Nobody wants to accept the extremes. 
 




Then let’s decide according to the principle of 
fairness. 6, 14 and 14, 6 are unacceptable and 
stay unacceptable. […] 
 
CATEGORY 1c: Allocations to the disadvantage of either player are unlikely (Group 10, Treatment 1) 
2  这0到20和20到0都不选。  They won’t choose 0, 20 and 20, 0  
1  哎，这两头叉绝对不能出现。  Both ends will certainly not come out.  
2  那就叉掉这两个呗。  Let’s simply reject.  
 
CATEGORY 1d: Rejecting All but the Middle (balanced) Allocations (Group 1, Treatment 3) 
3  我就同意中间这3项，4项，好了，其它的我都不同意。  I am only in favour of the middle 3 or 4 options. 
That’s it. I object to all others.  
CATEGORY 1e: Extensive Responder's Profit (Group 7, Treatment 1)   20
2  发送组接收的点数19。发送组得到的点数为1。  The responder receives 19. The proposer gets 1.  
  …  ... 
2  不同意这个。  Reject.  
1  不同意？  Reject? 
2  这是他们发送的，他们得1点的话，他们分的好少，我
们分的好多。 
This is what they send. They get only 1. This is such a 
small amount for them and so much for us.  
3  不同意，不同意。  Reject.  
 
CATEGORY 2b: Going for risk (Group 7, Treatment 1) 
2  发送组分给接收组的点数为11点。发送组得到的点数为9
点，这个可以同意，因为是他们发送出来的嘛。  […] 
Sender gives responder 11. Sender keeps 9. We 
can accept. If they send it... […]  
1  但是如果他们的话拒绝怎么办？  What if we reject? 
  …  … 
2  同意还是拒绝？  Accept or reject?? 
3  拒绝吧。  I am in favor of rejection. 
1  我赞成拒绝。  Me too 
3  拒绝。  Then let’s reject. 
2  好。  O.k. 
1  我觉得可以博一下，是这么想的。  We can risk something. 
 
CATEGORY 2c: Group specific systems, methods for acceptance or rejection. Group 3, Treatment 3 uses the random 
decision mechanism “rock, paper, scissors”. 
 
CATEGORY 2d: Point matching of advantageous offer and accepted allocation (Group 5, Treatment 2) 
2  我们接收，那就是我们不一致嘛，不一致那我们就得不
到分，他们得到8点，对不对？ 
If we accept we don’t match. We won’t receive 
anything and they get 8 points, right?  
1  对。如果我们一致的话，那我们就得20点，对不对？  Yes. If we match we will receive 20 points?  
2  对。  Yes. 
1  那我们打叉算了。  Then let’s reject. 
 
MAIN CATEGORY 3: Unlikeliness of High Offer (Group 7, Treatment 2) 
3  但是下面还可以考虑一下。他们肯定不会给我们啊，
肯定不会给我们这么多。 
We also have to think about offers down here [i.e. 
advantageous offers]. They certainly won’t give us 
that much. 
 
CATEGORY 4b: Face damage and CATEGORY 4c: Refusal due to other emotional, ethical, moral reasons  
(Group 6, Treatment 1) 




Too much for me gives me a bad conscience. I 
would prefer ... [2c] 
3  很注意形象。  Face damage? [2b] 
1  好象损失比我得到19还大。  The loss is even larger than losing 19.  
2  反正我觉得我不能接受这一个。  I can’t accept.  
1  我也不能。  Me neither.  
2  3的意思呢？  What about you? 
3  我也不能接受。  I cant’ accept either.  
 
MAIN CATEGORY 5: Unpleasant numbers (Group 6, Treatment 3) 
3  划叉，划叉，我看著不舒服。  Reject, reject. I feel uncomfortable 
when looking at it [the number].  
 
Even though uneasy feeling vis-à-vis an advantageous offer is not a category in our coding system we provide a 
quotation of the corresponding argument (Group 6, Treatment 1)    
2  其实那样，天上掉馅饼，肯定是陷阱。  A piece of cake falling from heaven can be noth-
ing like a ploy.  
2  这个，我觉得肯定也是拒绝。  Yes, reject. 
3  他是先给我们一点小恩小惠。  First they give us a small gift... 
  ...  ... 




Instructions (Original in Chinese) 
 
You take part in an interactive decision experiment between two groups of students in which you can 
earn money according to the decisions you take. The amount of money you earned will be paid to you 
in cash at the end of the experiment. 
In this experiment 2 types of players are involved: Senders and Responders. 
You have been randomly chosen to be a Sender / Responder. 
The role of either player group will be explained in a minute. 
Each Sending group is endowed with an amount of 20 tokens. 
The Sending group has to decide how to split these 20 tokens between their group and the receiving 
group. 
The decision must be an integer between 0 and 20.  
The Sending group’s decision has to be written down and marked in the corresponding box on the de-
cision sheet for the sender (see sheet attached). The decision has to be taken unanimously. All group 
members have to confirm the entry by his/her signature.  
The receiving group can accept or reject the decision. 
At the same time the receiving group has to indicate for any number of Tokens that the sending group 
may allocate to them whether they accept or reject the decision. This has to be done by marking the 
corresponding boxes on the decision sheet for the receiving group (see sheet attached). 
In case of rejection  
∗  both player groups receive nothing.  (Treatment 1) 
[ ½ The sending group receives 8 (8) Tokens. (Treatments 2 and 3) ] 
[ ½ The receiving group receives 0 (2) Tokens. (Treatments 2 and 3) ] 
In case of acceptance  
∗  both player groups receive the amounts as they have been allocated by the sender. 
For every Token your group earned each group member will be paid 2 RMB. 
Independently of the amount of money you earned during the experiment you will be given a show up 
fee of 10 RMB. 
The other group receives the same information as you do and knows that you also get this information. 
I will now handle the decision sheet over to you. For your information I show you a sample of the deci-
sion sheet for the sending/receiving group. 
You have up to 15 minutes to make your decision. 
Do you have any questions?   22
Decision Forms (Original in Chinese) 
Session:         Date: 
 
Decision Sheet for SENDERS 
 









20 0 20   
20 1 19   
20 2 18   
20 3 17   
20 4 16   
20 5 15   
20 6 14   
20 7 13   
20 8 12   
20 9 11   
20 10 10   
20 11  9   
20 12  8   
20 13  7   
20 14  6   
20 15  5   
20 16  4   
20 17  3   
20 18  2   
20 19  1   
20 20  0   
 
We allocate to the receiving group ............ Tokens. 
 
We as the sending group receive ............ Tokens. 
 
………………   ………………    ……………… 
       Signature         Signature                      Signature   23
Session:         Date: 
 










Mark here to 
ACCEPT 
Mark here to 
REJECT 
20 0 20     
20 1 19     
20 2 18     
20 3 17     
20 4 16     
20 5 15     
20 6 14     
20 7 13     
20 8 12     
20 9 11     
20 10 10     
20 11  9     
20 12  8     
20 13  7     
20 14  6     
20 15  5     
20 16  4     
20 17  3     
20 18  2     
20 19  1     
20 20  0     
 
………………   ………………    ……………… 
       Signature         Signature                      Signature   24
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